{"id":12756,"date":"2021-05-22T19:08:00","date_gmt":"2021-05-22T17:08:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/detlev.von.graeve.org\/?p=12756"},"modified":"2023-07-03T15:25:06","modified_gmt":"2023-07-03T13:25:06","slug":"douala-6-cameroon-led-by-the-trustee-to-underdevelopment-english-francais","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/detlev.von.graeve.org\/?p=12756","title":{"rendered":"E\/F1.6 Cameroun, plum\u00e9 par la France \/ Cameroon, managed by France"},"content":{"rendered":"

ORIGINAL : „DUALA“ (6)<\/span> : Kamerun – Vom Treuh\u00e4nder in die Unterentwicklung gef\u00fchrt – DEUTSCH (24.5.2021)\u00a0 (LINK<\/a>)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 + 2 acaps „Briefing notes:\u00a0 21-january-20 and 29 june 2023<\/span><\/h4>\n

Preface<\/span><\/h3>\n

Admittedly, I have a hard time with the political chapters (5) and (6) of this blog.<\/span> A broad topic that can hardly be seen through from the outside, and which can make you angry or depressed, depending on your point of view.<\/span> What I, as a contemporary of the 20th century, had noticed from the colonialism of Europe – especially France – shows its ugly face again in the current long-term consequences.<\/span> Hence the sarcastic headline.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Certes, j’ai du mal avec les chapitres politiques (5) et (6) de ce blog.<\/span> Un sujet large que l’on ne voit gu\u00e8re de l’ext\u00e9rieur, et qui peut vous mettre en col\u00e8re ou d\u00e9prim\u00e9, selon votre point de vue.<\/span> Ce que moi, en tant que contemporain du XXe si\u00e8cle, avais remarqu\u00e9 du colonialisme de l’Europe – en particulier de la France – montre \u00e0 nouveau sa grimace dans les cons\u00e9quences actuelles \u00e0 long terme.<\/span> D’o\u00f9 le titre sarcastique.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

HISTORY<\/span> <\/span><\/h2>\n

The impression that solidified during the readings shall be\u00a0 confirmed by El-Hussein Aw and Prosper Akouegnon at the end of the Blog<\/span> as<\/span><\/span> concept of the French governments since the 1950s.<\/span> That in no way means that our friendly neighbor should bear sole responsibility for Cameroon or the misery of Africa.<\/span> But I think it is fundamentally wrong to make the subject taboo or to make it unrecognizable by politicians‘ diplomatic lies.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

L’impression qui s’est solidifi\u00e9e lors des lectures sera confirm\u00e9e par El-Hussein Aw et Prosper Akouegnon \u00e0 la fin du Blog comme concept des gouvernements fran\u00e7ais depuis les ann\u00e9es 1950. Cela ne signifie en aucun cas que notre voisin ami doit porter seul la responsabilit\u00e9 du Cameroun ou de la mis\u00e8re de l\u2019Afrique. Mais je pense qu’il est fondamentalement faux de rendre le sujet tabou ou de le rendre m\u00e9connaissable par les mensonges diplomatiques des politiciens.<\/em>
\n<\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

The „independence movement“ in Cameroon and its defeat<\/span><\/span><\/h4>\n

The \u201cMARKK\u201d museum at Rothenbaum in Hamburg is currently devoting <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span> to the Duala Manga Bell <\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>an emotionally warm exhibition aimed at young people<\/span><\/span> (LINK)<\/a>, catalog optionally in English!). Still, I don’t want to start with the day of his execution <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>at the beginning of the murderous „World War“ in Europe<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>. With the conflict over their ancestral property in the center of Douala, the urban Duala elite experienced firsthand the violence of the colonial conquest that other peoples of Cameroon suffered from for years. The fact that the German colonial masters were soon exchanged, confused allegiances after 1919 and prevented common resistance. Europe, weakened by wars and revolutions, held the conquered colonies for another forty years – and beyond. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The modern independence movement of Cameroon began with the demand for immediate and complete independence immediately after World War II and in the now global crisis of European colonial domination \u201cThe independence movement was led by an elite trained at the University of Dakar (Senegal) and supported by a national bourgeoisie and urban workers experienced in protest\u201d (P. Moraz\u00e1n, 14). Their political party was the UPC (Union de la Population camerounaise), founded in 1947, which insisted on the UN’s renewed assurance of a time limit on the „trusteeship“ of France and Great Britain. But France succeeded in eliminating the UPC, a process that dragged on until 1972 despite the limited social base of the \u2018communist\u2019 cadre party. They were forced into illegality as early as 1955. Their guerrillas were defeated in a locally limited colonial war. The functionaries were driven into exile and\/or murdered, as in 1960 Dr. F\u00e9lix-Roland Moumie (* 1926 Fumban) through poison (!) In Geneva. The UPC called for a merger with the British-administered Southwest early on and warned of an impending \u201cneo-colonial future of Cameroon\u201d. de Gaulle has been quoted as saying that no one in this world could achieve complete independence (L.H.Aw). This may be true, but it does not erase political and economic \u201cabuse of control\u201d.<\/span> At most, Europe could blame the few evicted colonies, but how long did this situation last?<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The government of Cameroon, which became formally independent in 1960, not only extended the state of emergency declared in 1958 and continued to employ French administrative officials, teachers, military personnel and torturers. She also took over the enemy image of the UPC and completely erased the organization from public memory for decades until 1991 (Ketzmerick p.208-9).<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Le \u00abmouvement ind\u00e9pendantiste\u00bb au Cameroun et sa d\u00e9faite<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/em><\/h4>\n

Le mouvement d’ind\u00e9pendance moderne du Cameroun a commenc\u00e9 avec la demande d’ind\u00e9pendance imm\u00e9diate et compl\u00e8te juste apr\u00e8s la Seconde Guerre mondiale et dans la crise d\u00e9sormais mondiale de la domination coloniale europ\u00e9enne. <\/span><\/span>\u00abLe mouvement ind\u00e9pendantiste \u00e9tait dirig\u00e9 par une \u00e9lite form\u00e9e \u00e0 l’Universit\u00e9 de Dakar (S\u00e9n\u00e9gal) et soutenu par une bourgeoisie nationale et des ouvriers urbains ayant une exp\u00e9rience de protestation\u00bb (P. Moraz\u00e1n, 14). Son organisation politique \u00e9tait l’UPC (Union de la Population camerounaise), qui a insist\u00e9 sur l’assurance renouvel\u00e9e de l’ONU d’une\u00a0 ‚tutelle‘ temporaire de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne. Mais la France a r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 \u00e9liminer politiquement et militairement <\/span><\/span>l’UPC<\/span><\/span> – <\/span><\/span>une lutte difficile qui a d\u00e9pass\u00e9 l’ind\u00e9pendance formelle <\/span><\/span>malgr\u00e9 la base sociale limit\u00e9e du parti des cadres aux influences communistes\u00a0 D\u00e9j\u00e0 depuis 1955, l’UPC \u00e9tait „ill\u00e9gal“, une guerre coloniale locale cach\u00e9e<\/span> etait men\u00e9e contre leur gu\u00e9rilla, les fonctionnaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 pouss\u00e9s \u00e0 l’exil ou assassin\u00e9s, l<\/span><\/span>e Dr F\u00e9lix-Roland Moumie <\/span><\/span>d\u00e9j\u00e0 en 1960 <\/span><\/span>\u00e0 Gen\u00e8ve <\/span><\/span>par le poison (!)<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

l’UPC appelait \u00e0 une fusion avec le sud-ouest administr\u00e9 par les Britanniques mettait le Camerounais en garde contre un \u00abavenir n\u00e9ocolonial\u00bb imminent Cameroun \u00bb.\u00a0 de Gaulle aurait d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que personne dans ce monde ne pouvait obtenir une ind\u00e9pendance compl\u00e8te (L.H.Aw). C’est peut-\u00eatre vrai, mais cela n’efface pas \u00abl’abus de tutelle\u00bb politique et \u00e9conomique. Tout au plus, l’Europe pouvait rejeter la responsabilit\u00e9 des quelques colonies expuls\u00e9es, mais combien d’ann\u00e9es cette situation a-t-elle dur\u00e9?<\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Le gouvernement du Cameroun, officiellement ind\u00e9pendant en 1960, a non seulement maintenu l’\u00e9tat d’urgence d\u00e9clar\u00e9 en 1958 et a continu\u00e9 d’employer des fonctionnaires de l’administration, des enseignants, des militaires (et des tortionnaires) fran\u00e7ais. Elle adopte \u00e9galement l’image ennemie de l’UPC et a compl\u00e8tement effac\u00e9 l’organisation de la m\u00e9moire publique pendant trois d\u00e9cennies (Ketzmerick p.208-9).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Remember the international context for the actors at the time. <\/span><\/span><\/h4>\n

After liberation from German occupation, France had tried militarily to regain Indochina for ten years, which ended in a catastrophe in 1954. At the same time, a brutal colonial war began in Algeria, even France’s conscript youth were drafted. This defeat was not yet sealed when the French state released Cameroon and the other African colonies (except Guinea) – reluctantly but according to a comprehensive plan – into neo-colonial bogus independence (P. Akouegnon). Domestically, France was weak, the inflation of the franc galloped, the governments changed ‚weekly‘ and in 1958 the military staged a coup in favor of General de Gaulle, who founded the Fifth Republic and re-established France’s role as a ‚middle power‘ globally. To do this, La France urgently needed her former colonies in Africa (Saw). At that time, the Cold War intensified with the Soviet Union, leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1961 and the erection of the \u201cBerlin Wall\u201d in Germany and proxy wars. The UN was divided and incapacitated, as demonstrated during the terrible civil war in the former Belgian Congo. The Committee overseeing the trust areas nodded off France’s plans for Cameroon and, of course, betrayed the Cameroon peoples, whom the UN had promised full decolonization.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Il faut se souvenir du contexte international des acteurs de l’\u00e9poque. <\/span><\/span><\/em><\/h4>\n

Apr\u00e8s sa lib\u00e9ration de l’occupation allemande, la France avait tent\u00e9 de regagner militairement l’Indochine pendant dix ans, ce qui s’est sold\u00e9 par une catastrophe en 1954. Au m\u00eame moment, une guerre coloniale brutale a \u00e9clat\u00e9 en Alg\u00e9rie, et m\u00eame les jeunes conscrits de France ont \u00e9t\u00e9 enr\u00f4l\u00e9s. Cette d\u00e9faite n’\u00e9tait pas encore scell\u00e9e lorsque l’Etat fran\u00e7ais a lib\u00e9r\u00e9 le Cameroun et les autres colonies africaines (\u00e0 l’exception de la Guin\u00e9e) – \u00e0 contrec\u0153ur mais selon un plan global – dans une fausse ind\u00e9pendance n\u00e9ocoloniale (P. Akouegnon). Sur le plan int\u00e9rieur, la France \u00e9tait faible, l’inflation du franc galopait, les gouvernements changeaient „ chaque semaine “ et en 1958 l’arm\u00e9e a organis\u00e9 un coup d’\u00c9tat en faveur du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de Gaulle, qui a fond\u00e9 la Ve R\u00e9publique et r\u00e9tabli le r\u00f4le de la France en tant que „ puissance moyenne “. \u00abglobalement; pour cela, La France avait un besoin urgent de ses anciennes colonies en Afrique. (Vu) \u00c0 cette \u00e9poque, la guerre froide s’est intensifi\u00e9e avec l’Union sovi\u00e9tique, conduisant \u00e0 la crise des missiles de Cuba en 1961 et \u00e0 l’\u00e9rection du \u00abmur de Berlin\u00bb en Allemagne et \u00e0 des guerres par procuration. L’ONU \u00e9tait divis\u00e9e et bloqu\u00e9e, comme en t\u00e9moigne la terrible guerre civile dans l’ancien Congo belge. Le comit\u00e9 de supervision des zones de confiance a ignor\u00e9 les plans de la France pour le Cameroun et, bien s\u00fbr, \u00aba trahi le peuple camerounais, \u00e0 qui l’ONU avait promis une d\u00e9colonisation totale.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

October 1961: \u201cSouthern Cameroons\u201d joins the \u201cR\u00e9publique Cameroun\u201d .<\/span><\/span><\/h4>\n

„Southern Cameroons“, the south of a border strip of Cameroon, which had been administered for almost forty years as part of the British colony of Nigeria, joined the R\u00e9publique Cameroun, which has been independent since January 1960, after a referendum and a meeting of the respective heads of government.<\/span> I have read somewhere that the population felt neglected by the British colonial administration and chose the supposedly progressive former French colony after a separate state independence seemed unattainable.<\/span> Above all, the \u2018anglophone\u2019 elite received the promise to rule an autonomous part of the state while maintaining the official language English, the British educational and legal system, all under the federal constitutional structure of the Octobre 1961: \u00abSouthern Cameroons\u00bb rejoint la \u00abR\u00e9publique Cameroun\u00bb (janvier 1960). Le „Southern Cameroons“, au sud d’une bande frontali\u00e8re du Cameroun, qui avait \u00e9t\u00e9 administr\u00e9e pendant pr\u00e8s de quarante ans dans le cadre de la colonie britannique du Nig\u00e9ria, a rejoint la R\u00e9publique Cameroun, ind\u00e9pendante depuis janvier 1960, apr\u00e8s un r\u00e9f\u00e9rendum et une r\u00e9union des chefs de gouvernement respectifs. J’ai lu quelque part que la population se sentait n\u00e9glig\u00e9e par l’administration coloniale britannique et avait choisi l’ancienne colonie fran\u00e7aise pr\u00e9tendument progressiste apr\u00e8s qu’un \u00c9tat ind\u00e9pendant s\u00e9par\u00e9 semblait inaccessible. Surtout, l\u2019\u00e9lite \u00abanglophone\u00bb a re\u00e7u la promesse de diriger une partie autonome de l\u2019\u00c9tat tout en maintenant la langue officielle anglaise, les syst\u00e8mes \u00e9ducatif et juridique britanniques, le tout sous la structure constitutionnelle f\u00e9d\u00e9rale<\/span> R\u00e9publique f\u00e9d\u00e9rale du Cameroun <\/em>(\u201eun Etat autonome de langue anglaise au sein d\u2019une f\u00e9d\u00e9ration binationale<\/em>\u201c).<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

Octobre 1961: \u00abSouthern Cameroons\u00bb rejoint la \u00abR\u00e9publique Cameroun\u00bb.<\/span> <\/span><\/em><\/h4>\n

Le „Southern Cameroons“, au sud d’une bande frontali\u00e8re du Cameroun, qui avait \u00e9t\u00e9 administr\u00e9e pendant pr\u00e8s de quarante ans dans le cadre de la colonie britannique du Nig\u00e9ria, a rejoint la R\u00e9publique Cameroun, ind\u00e9pendante depuis janvier 1960, apr\u00e8s un r\u00e9f\u00e9rendum et une r\u00e9union<\/span> des chefs de gouvernement respectifs.<\/span> J’ai lu quelque part que la population se sentait n\u00e9glig\u00e9e par l’administration coloniale britannique et avait choisi l’ancienne colonie fran\u00e7aise pr\u00e9tendument progressiste apr\u00e8s qu’un \u00c9tat ind\u00e9pendant s\u00e9par\u00e9 semblait inaccessible.<\/span> Surtout, l\u2019\u00e9lite \u00abanglophone\u00bb a re\u00e7u la promesse de diriger une partie autonome de l\u2019\u00c9tat tout en maintenant la langue officielle anglaise, les syst\u00e8mes \u00e9ducatif et juridique britanniques, le tout sous la structure constitutionnelle f\u00e9d\u00e9rale de la R\u00e9publique f\u00e9d\u00e9rale du Cameroun, \u00ab \u00e9tat autonome de langue anglaise au sein d’une f\u00e9d\u00e9ration binationale \u00bb.<\/span> <\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Were there no doubts about the constitution?<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

Who in Yaound\u00e9 or Paris actually came up with the bilinguisme institutionel, the \u201cinstitutionalized bilingualism\u201d, this daring construct for a newly founded multiethnic state without state tradition?<\/span> Nobody would have thought of that by European standards, only later to the European Union for the divided Balkans.<\/span> An extremely centralized France had previously done everything to bind \u2018their\u2019 colonies to itself forever, primarily through the French language and legal and educational systems!<\/span> Who actually believed the bad joke back then or pretended to believe it?<\/span> And why?<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

N’y avait-il aucun doute sur la constitution?<\/span> <\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Qui \u00e0 Yaound\u00e9 ou \u00e0 Paris a invent\u00e9 le \u00abbilinguisme institutionnalis\u00e9\u00bb, cette construction audacieuse d’un \u00c9tat multiethnique nouvellement invent\u00e9 sans tradition \u00e9tatique bien fond\u00e9e?<\/span> Au contraire, une France extr\u00eamement centralis\u00e9e avait auparavant tout fait pour encha\u00eener \u00e0 jamais \u00abses\u00bb colonies \u00e0 elle-m\u00eame, principalement par le monopole de la langue fran\u00e7aise et de son syst\u00e8me juridique et \u00e9ducatif!<\/span> Qui croyait vraiment \u00e0 la mauvaise blague \u00e0 l’\u00e9poque ou pr\u00e9tendait y croire?<\/span> Et pourquoi?<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Two Dictators, two Eras <\/span><\/span><\/h4>\n

With Ahmadou Ahidjo, a sympathetic young Muslim politician from the north, a Peul, whom France had appointed as Prime Minister of the transitional government in 1958, Cameroon’s first President renwed all the special powers of the „state of emergency“ into „independence“, with the argument of „internal security“ (Ketzmerick). He gradually introduced a presidential dictatorship and merged various parties already friends of France to form the \u201cUC\u201d unity party. In May 1972, he organized a referendum (99.9% approval result) to make the Federal Republic a United Republic of Cameroon. With seven administrative provinces instead of four, the English-speaking southwest was already degraded. <\/span><\/span>,<\/span><\/span>Then a powerless Assembl\u00e9e Nationale<\/em> replaced the federal pseudo-parliaments. The first and second presidents, Paul Biya, have since ruled the state by government decree. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

After moving from the post of Prime Minister to the Presidency of the President in 1982, Paul Biya continued the policy of creeping marginalization of „Anglophones“ through systematic discrimination. This also included symbolic acts: in 1984, he removed by decree the term „united“ from the name of the state as the last trace of the 1961 constitution. Since then, representatives of the English-speaking movements have vehemently called for a return to federalism <\/span><\/span>of <\/span><\/span>the first constitution,“ taking into account the cultural duality of Cameroon „. President Biya refused in 1990 again to legalize the English-speaking political party. It was not until 1992 that he organized elections between several parties under the pressure of mass demonstrations (for example in Douala) due to a serious economic crisis and last but not least of the \u201cParistroika\u201d hype, the democratic movement of French-speaking Africa. However, that did not stop Biya from continuing to rule in 1992 and 1997, but also in 2004, 2011 and 2018 – as an „election winner“ in his fictitious democracy. During his thirty-year reign he became famous for his political inactivity – the Prime Minister, currently a Southwestern man, takes care of day-to-day affairs anyway. To this day, Biya spends much of the year with his ‚court‘ in Geneva and rarely shows up in Cameroon. But France is next. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Deux dictateurs, deux \u00e9poques<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/h4>\n

Avec Ahmadou Ahidjo, un jeune politicien musulman sympathique du nord, un Peul, que la France avait nomm\u00e9 Premier ministre du gouvernement de transition en 1958, le premier pr\u00e9sident du Cameroun a \u00e9tendu tous les pouvoirs sp\u00e9ciaux de l’\u00e9tat d’urgence au-del\u00e0 de \u00abl’ind\u00e9pendance\u00bb. avec l’argument de la \u00abs\u00e9curit\u00e9 int\u00e9rieure\u00bb (Ketzmerick). Il introduit progressivement une dictature pr\u00e9sidentielle et fusionne divers partis d\u00e9j\u00e0 amis de la France pour former le parti d’unit\u00e9 \u00abUC\u00bb. En mai 1972, il organisa un r\u00e9f\u00e9rendum (r\u00e9sultat d’approbation \u00e0 99,9%) pour faire de la R\u00e9publique f\u00e9d\u00e9rale une R\u00e9publique-Unie du Cameroun. Avec sept provinces administratives au lieu de quatre, le sud-ouest anglophone \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 d\u00e9pass\u00e9. Dans tous les cas, une assembl\u00e9e nationale impuissante a remplac\u00e9 les pseudo-parlements \u00abf\u00e9d\u00e9raux\u00bb. Le premier et le deuxi\u00e8me pr\u00e9sidents, Paul Biya, ont depuis dirig\u00e9 l’\u00c9tat par d\u00e9cret. <\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Apr\u00e8s \u00eatre pass\u00e9 de la fonction de Premier ministre \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence du pr\u00e9sident en 1982, Paul Biya a poursuivi la politique de marginalisation rampante des \u00abanglophones\u00bb \u00e0 travers une discrimination syst\u00e9matique. Cela comprenait \u00e9galement des actes symboliques: en 1984, il a supprim\u00e9 le terme \u00abuni\u00bb du nom de l’\u00c9tat comme derni\u00e8re trace de la constitution de 1961. Depuis lors, les repr\u00e9sentants des mouvements anglophones ont r\u00e9clam\u00e9 avec v\u00e9h\u00e9mence un retour au \u00abf\u00e9d\u00e9ralisme\u00bb de la premi\u00e8re constitution, \u00aben tenant compte de la dualit\u00e9 culturelle du Cameroun\u00bb. Le pr\u00e9sident Biya a refus\u00e9\u00a0 en 1990 <\/span><\/span><\/span>encore <\/span><\/span><\/span>de l\u00e9galiser le parti politique anglophone. Ce n’est qu’\u00e0 partir de 1992 qu’il organise des \u00e9lections entre plusieurs partis sous la pression de manifestations de masse (par exemple Duala) en raison d’une grave crise \u00e9conomique et enfin et surtout dans le climat \u00abParistroika\u00bb, le mouvement d\u00e9mocratique d’Afrique francophone. Cependant, cela n’a pas emp\u00each\u00e9 Biya de continuer \u00e0 gouverner en 1992 et 1997, mais aussi en 2004, 2011 et 2018 – <\/span>en tant que \u00abvainqueur des \u00e9lections\u00bb dans sa d\u00e9mocratie fictive. Au cours de ses trente ann\u00e9es de r\u00e8gne, il est devenu c\u00e9l\u00e8bre pour son inactivit\u00e9 politique – le Premier ministre, actuellement un homme du Sud-Ouest, s’occupe de toute fa\u00e7on des affaires quotidiennes. <\/span><\/span><\/span>\u00c0 ce jour, Biya passe une grande partie de l’ann\u00e9e avec sa cour \u00e0 Gen\u00e8ve et se pr\u00e9sente rarement au Cameroun. Mais la France est \u00e0 c\u00f4t\u00e9.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

A „binational“ language dispute? <\/span><\/span><\/h3>\n

Labeling the ongoing conflict between the southwest and the rest of the country as a language conflict between „Francophonie“ and „Anglophonie“ can be misleading. Because the languages \u200b\u200bspoken among the population are not in conflict, as the detailed and sober study „Cameroun – R\u00e9publique du Cameroun – Republic of Cameroon“ by the Laval University shows. But the ‚Anglophone minorities‘ are encountering practical obstacles everywhere.<\/span><\/span>\u00a0 They were already part of the region at a time when the name \u201cCameroon\u201d did not even exist or only referred to the coastal strip dominated by the Duala. At that time – until 1884 – the English influence was dominant, that of other European nations ephemeral. When the Germans came, there was fierce competition for a few decades, but the new masters often had to use the common pidgin English when dealing with their subjects. Based on ‚African‘ grammars and with ‚polyphonic‘ vocabulary, this has been the lingua franca in the entire south of Cameroon since the 19th century and has now even broken down into regional and social offshoots. See \u00abCamfranglais\u00bb. <\/span>
\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

LIONEL JEAN tells us more details on the relationship between the languages \u200b\u200bin Cameroon: <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Two hundred tribal languages \u200b\u200bregistered in Cameroon (langues nationales<\/em> or<\/span><\/span> camerounaises<\/em>) are spoken less and less from generation to generation and are disappearing. With exceptions, they have never been taught in schools and are no longer researched since 1990 (L. Jean). They are still used on the radio for the roughly 40% illiterate population in the countryside. I<\/span><\/span>n their command of one of the two state languages, urban and rural populations differ greatly, which is related to school attendance. T<\/span><\/span>he official school languages <\/span><\/span>are being ’nationalized‘\u00a0 under local influences<\/span><\/span>. The command of the ’second official language‘, English, does not help individuals outside their region at all, neither in their careers nor in relation to the authorities. According to the linguist Lionel Jean (Laval), the fact that English has not completely disappeared from Cameroon is due to his international „strategic“ position. (L. Jean, 39) <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

„In general, Cameroonians see themselves primarily as French or English-speaking. If the state is bilingual, its citizens don’t have to be, because a bilingual state does not necessarily imply bilingual people. For example, the vast majority of Canadians and Belgians have remained monolingual , while their central state is bilingual. (…) Francophones are generally more bilingual (approx. 25%) than Anglophones (approx. 20%). As a result, efforts to speak the other official language remain shy, while pidgin English takes precedence over the official languages. “ (Lionel Jean, translated)<\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>„The use of pidgin English is more popular than French and English combined, especially in the entire southwest and in the capital Yaund\u00e9. It is the Cameroonian language that you can find in the market, in church, at the doctor’s, at the police station<\/span><\/span> and used in the capital’s offices.<\/span> Some politicians don’t even hesitate to speak to their potential voters in pidgin English, and state radio uses it in emergency situations.<\/span> Although this „bush English“ (\u00abanglais de brousse\u00bb) is officially banned and hated by many, it seems to be a ’necessary evil‘ in this country where multilingualism is omnipresent „. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

(Lionel Jean, 39, translated)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Un conflit linguistique \u00abbinational\u00bb? <\/span><\/span><\/em><\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Les langues parl\u00e9es au sein de la population ne sont pas en conflit, comme le montre l’\u00e9tude d\u00e9taill\u00e9e et sobre \u00abR\u00e9publique du Cameroun -\u00bb de l’Universit\u00e9 Laval (<\/span><\/span>https:\/\/www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca\/afrique\/cameroun.htm). Les \u00abminorit\u00e9s anglophones\u00bb\u00a0\u00a0 faisaient d\u00e9j\u00e0 partie de la r\u00e9gion \u00e0 une \u00e9poque o\u00f9 le nom de \u00abCameroun\u00bb n’existait m\u00eame pas ou faisait uniquement r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 la bande c\u00f4ti\u00e8re domin\u00e9e par les Douala. A cette \u00e9poque – jusqu’en 1884 – l’influence anglaise \u00e9tait dominante, celle des autres nations europ\u00e9ennes \u00e9ph\u00e9m\u00e8re. Lorsque les Allemands sont arriv\u00e9s, il y a eu une comp\u00e9tition pendant quelques d\u00e9cennies, mais les nouveaux ma\u00eetres ont souvent d\u00fb utiliser le pidgin anglais commun pour traiter leurs sujets. Bas\u00e9e sur des grammaires \u00abafricaines\u00bb et sur un vocabulaire \u00abpolyphonique\u00bb, elle est la lingua franca dans tout le sud du Cameroun depuis le XIXe si\u00e8cle et se d\u00e9compose m\u00eame en ramifications r\u00e9gionales et sociales. Voir \u00ab<\/span>Camfranglais\u00bb<\/span>. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

LIONEL JEAN nous raconte plus de d\u00e9tails sur la relation entre les langues au Cameroun:<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Deux cents langues nationales ou camerounaises enregistr\u00e9es sont de moins en moins parl\u00e9es de g\u00e9n\u00e9ration en g\u00e9n\u00e9ration, et certaines disparaissent. Sauf exceptions, ils n’ont jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 enseign\u00e9s dans les \u00e9coles et ne font plus l’objet de recherches depuis 1990 (L. Jean). Ils sont toujours utilis\u00e9s \u00e0 la radio pour les quelque 40% de la population analphab\u00e8te des campagnes. Dans leur ma\u00eetrise de l’une des deux langues officielles, les populations urbaines et rurales diff\u00e8rent consid\u00e9rablement, ce qui est li\u00e9 \u00e0 la fr\u00e9quentation scolaire. Les langues officielles de l’\u00e9cole se \u00abnationalisent\u00bb sous les influences locales. La ma\u00eetrise de la \u00abdeuxi\u00e8me langue officielle\u00bb, l’anglais, n’aide pas du tout les personnes ext\u00e9rieures \u00e0 leur r\u00e9gion, ni dans leur carri\u00e8re ni en relation avec les autorit\u00e9s. Selon le linguiste Lionel Jean (Laval), le fait que l’anglais n’ait pas compl\u00e8tement disparu du Cameroun est d\u00fb \u00e0 sa position \u00abstrat\u00e9gique\u00bb internationale. (L. Jean, 39)<\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

En g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, les Camerounais se consid\u00e8rent principalement comme francophones ou anglophones. Si l’\u00c9tat est bilingue, ses citoyens ne sont pas oblig\u00e9s de l’\u00eatre, car un \u00c9tat bilingue n’implique pas n\u00e9cessairement des personnes bilingues. Par exemple, la grande majorit\u00e9 des Canadiens et des Canadiennes<\/span> Les Belges sont rest\u00e9s monolingues, alors que leur \u00c9tat central est bilingue. (…) Les francophones sont g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement plus bilingues (environ 25%) que les anglophones (environ 20%). Par cons\u00e9quent, les efforts pour parler l’autre langue officielle restent timides<\/span> , tandis que l’anglais pidgin a la priorit\u00e9 sur les langues officielles.<\/span> <\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

La coexistence l\u00e9galement obligatoire de deux syst\u00e8mes juridiques et syst\u00e8mes \u00e9ducatifs europ\u00e9ens \u00e9choue, notamment lorsqu’il s’agit d’offrir aux personnes qui y vivent les m\u00eames chances de r\u00e9ussite.<\/span> Les \u00abminorit\u00e9s anglophones\u00bb recontrent partout des obstacles pratiques.Les candidats \u00abanglophones\u00bb du sud-ouest se voient syst\u00e9matiquement discrimin\u00e9s et emp\u00each\u00e9s d’avancer dans la fonction publique.<\/span>\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/span>\u00ab<\/span><\/span><\/span>Dans l’arme\u0301e, seul le franc\u0327ais est admis. Les anglophones et pidginophones doivent donc devenir bilingues.\u00bb <\/span><\/span><\/span>( L. Jean 30)<\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

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2019 – 2021<\/h2>\n
\"Doku\"<\/a>

unhcr_nigeria_-_cameroon_refugees_situation_july2020 ACAPS<\/p><\/div>\n

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The Biya regime has been promising a \u201cdialogue\u201d with English-speaking Cameroon since 2019 only. In the meantime, politicians are already calling for secession and armed militias violently blackmail the rural population into an \u201ceducation strike\u201d against \u201cthe programs of the Ministry of Education in Yaound\u00e9\u201d. Displacement due to the armed conflict is alarming. The preconditions for dialogue are therefore very unfavorable. (See David Signer and the ACAPS Education Report)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Le r\u00e9gime Biya promet un „dialogue“ avec le Cameroun anglophone depuis <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>2019<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span> seulement. Entretemps des politiciens<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span> appellent d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e0 la s\u00e9cession <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>et des milices arm\u00e9es font violemment chanter la population rurale en une „gr\u00e8ve de l’\u00e9ducation“ contre „les programmes du minist\u00e8re de l’\u00c9ducation \u00e0 Yaound\u00e9“. Les d\u00e9placements \u00e0 cause du conflit arm\u00e9 sont alarmants. <\/span>Les conditions pr\u00e9alables au dialogue sont donc tr\u00e8s d\u00e9favorables.<\/span> (Voir David Signer et le rapport sur l’\u00e9ducation de l’ACAPS)<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

SITUATION ACTUELLE\u00a0 selon ACAPS<\/span><\/h2>\n

acaps 21-january 2020<\/span><\/strong>\u00a0 20200121_acaps_short_note_escalation_of_the_anglophone_crisis_cameroon_0.pdf\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 –\u00a0 <\/em>with map of Cameroon „Escalation of the Anglophone crisis“ (Separatist fighters, limited success of Swiss mediation efforts, refugees<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

acaps 29 June 2023 <\/strong>(20230629_ACAPS_Cameroon_cholera.pdf<\/em>) „Increase in cholera cases“ (coincides with a crisisin the health system, conflict and displacement, overview)
\n<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Neocolonialism <\/span><\/span>„<\/span><\/span>all-inclusive“<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/h2>\n

„France’s post-colonial sub-Saharan policy presents itself as a complex, contradicting and, in terms of motives and consequences, controversial mixture of colonial ties, geopolitical<\/span> calculations, economic interests and cultural awareness of mission.“ (El-Hussein Aw p. 83) <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The topic of France’s Africa policy has little presence in the German public. Even the Bundeswehr’s appearance in Mali only occasionally makes it into the print media, and even less so into the government-related public television. In Cameroon, the various connections to France are of course omnipresent. El-Houssein Aw – Excerpts from his study (2005) and in \u201cM\u00e9moire Online\u201d The Aw\u2019s study provides us with a common thread to bring this confusing and, especially in the first few years, rapidly changing situation into a certain order. At this point, the following information – including the summary of the basic agreement of 1960 with the colonies – must suffice.<\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Independence under certain conditions<\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/h4>\n

Michel D\u00e9br\u00e9, General de Gaulle’s Prime Minister, wrote on July 15, 1960 to the Gabonese President-elect L\u00e9on M\u2019ba: \u201cIndependence is granted on the condition that the state, once independent, undertakes to comply with the previously signed cooperation agreements. There are two systems that operate at the same time: the independence agreement and the cooperation agreements. One cannot be done without the other. I would be grateful if you would confirm by confirming receipt of this communication that the Government of the Gabonese Republic will continue to sign cooperation agreements after the proclamation of independence. The text was initialed that day and steps will be taken immediately to ensure that it comes into force. It goes without saying that it will be the same on the part of the Government of the French Republic.<\/em> “ (translated from: Aw Online) <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThe foreign policy agreements, the only ones concluded in the form of state treaties requiring ratification, can serve as the basis for the entirety of the cooperation agreements. In the agreements on military cooperation, a fundamental distinction was made between defense and technical military aid agreements. The defense agreements concluded with eleven states provided for agreements on all questions relating to external security and granted France the right to maintain military bases and to use the military infrastructure. In return, Paris assured the African governments ‚pour leur d\u00e9fense contre toute menace‘ (sic!) – also against internal threats – support. The secret conventions on the maintenance of internal order and security are said to have stipulated a formal request from the French government as a prerequisite for the deployment of French troops. – During de Gaulle’s reign, seven former African colonies underwent a change of power or coup d’\u00e9tat. – (\u2026.) The Technical Military Agreements obliged France to support thirteen of its fourteen successor states in building up their own armed forces. The African states parties agreed to turn exclusively or primarily to France for the procurement, maintenance and renewal of weapons and other war material. Defense cooperation agreements also included agreements on strategically important raw materials and products. They envisaged a common raw materials policy and obliged the African countries to export crude oil, natural gas, uranium, thorium, lithium, beryllium, helium as well as ores and their compounds en priority to France and to help the French armed forces with their storage \u201d. (ibid.)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThe most important agreements in terms of economic policy and associated with an obvious loss of sovereignty concerned currency relations. In functional contrast to the politico-territorial balkanization of the region, they provided for the supranational regulation of monetary relations within the framework of the franc zone, a structure that is still unique in the world today, which guarantees fourteen sovereign states a common currency – the CFA franc – whose convertibility is the French treasury ensures. “ (ibid.) <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThe cultural agreements that shaped the elite were also of lasting importance in terms of political influence. In them, the states of Francophone „Africa“ \u200b\u200bpledged to retain French as the official language and instrument of their development „and to turn to France as a priority to meet their needs for teachers. Settlement conventions, agreements on cooperation in judicial angling units and personal assistance in setting up state structures completed the agreement. “ (ibid) \u201cAs the result of a peaceful decolonization process, which was largely regulated by contractual agreement, the bilateral contractual system of cooperation guaranteed the continuity of Franco-African relations by aligning the political and economic structures of Francophone Africa with the former colonial power. The majority of the agreements, renegotiated in the mid-sixties and early seventies, have survived to this day and form the contractual framework for an astonishingly amicable relationship. “ (Aw Online) <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>

Dekolonisation Afrikas Aw p.86<\/p><\/div>\n

\"Doku\"<\/a>

La carte des deux Zones Franc CFA www.izf.net:izf:…(invalid 5-2021)<\/p><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

CLICK twice! \u00a0\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

N\u00e9ocolonialisme ‚tout compris‘<\/span> <\/span><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

El-Houssein Aw – Extraits de son \u00e9tude (2005) et sur \u00abM\u00e9moire en ligne\u00bb:<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/h4>\n

„La politique sub-saharienne postcoloniale de la France se pr\u00e9sente comme un m\u00e9lange complexe, contradictoire et, en termes de motifs et de cons\u00e9quences, controvers\u00e9 de liens coloniaux, de calculs g\u00e9opolitiques, d’int\u00e9r\u00eats \u00e9conomiques et de conscience culturelle de la mission.“ (El-Hussein Aw p. 83) <\/span><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

La politique africaine de la France est peu pr\u00e9sente dans l’opinion publique allemande. M\u00eame gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 la participation de la Bundeswehr au Mali, elle ne parvient qu’occasionnellement \u00e0 la presse \u00e9crite et encore moins \u00e0 notre t\u00e9l\u00e9vision trop proche du gouvernement. Au Cameroun, les diff\u00e9rents liens avec la France sont bien s\u00fbr omnipr\u00e9sents. <\/span><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

L\u2019\u00e9tude de l\u2019Aw nous fournit un fil conducteur pour ramener cette situation d\u00e9routante et, surtout au cours des premi\u00e8res d\u00e9cennies, en \u00e9volution rapide dans un certain ordre. Les informations suivantes – y compris le r\u00e9sum\u00e9 des accords de base de 1960 – ne peuvent que donner une id\u00e9e. <\/span><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Ind\u00e9pendance sous conditions <\/span><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/h4>\n

Michel D\u00e9br\u00e9, Premier ministre du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de Gaulle, \u00e9crivait le 15 juillet 1960 au pr\u00e9sident \u00e9lu gabonais L\u00e9on M\u2019ba: \u00ab <\/span><\/span>On donne l’ind\u00e9pendance \u00e0 condition (sic !) que l’Etat une fois ind\u00e9pendant s’engage \u00e0 respecter les accords de coop\u00e9ration sign\u00e9s ant\u00e9rieurement. Il y a deux syst\u00e8mes qui entrent en vigueur simultan\u00e9ment : ind\u00e9pendance et les accords de coop\u00e9ration. L’un ne va pas sans l’autre.\u00a0 (…) Je vous serais oblig\u00e9 de bien vouloir, en accusant r\u00e9ception de cettte communication, me confirmer que, des la proclamation de l’ind\u00e9pendance de la R\u00e9publique gabonaise, le gouvernement de la R\u00e9publique gabonaise proc\u00e9dera \u00e0 la signature des accords de coop\u00e9ration…, actes dont le texte a \u00e9t\u00e9 paraph\u00e9 en date de ce jour et qu’il prendra aussit\u00f4t les mesures propres \u00e0 assurer leur propre entr\u00e9e en vigueur. Il va de soi qu’il en sera de m\u00eame de la part du gouvernement de la R\u00e9publique fran\u00e7aise.\u00ab (citation : Aw Online avec sources d’information, note* 157<\/span><\/span>) <\/span><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00abCes accords de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re, qui \u00e9taient les seuls conclus sous la forme de trait\u00e9s d\u2019\u00c9tat \u00e0 ratifier, peuvent servir de base \u00e0 l\u2019ensemble des accords de coop\u00e9ration. Dans les accords de coop\u00e9ration militaire, une distinction fondamentale a \u00e9t\u00e9 faite entre les accords de d\u00e9fense et d\u2019aide militaire technique. Les accords de d\u00e9fense conclus avec onze Etats pr\u00e9voyaient des accords sur toutes les questions relatives \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 ext\u00e9rieure et accordaient \u00e0 la France le droit d’entretenir des bases militaires et d’utiliser les infrastructures militaires. En retour, Paris a assur\u00e9 aux gouvernements africains \u00abpour leur d\u00e9fense contre toute menace\u00bb (sic!) – \u00e9galement contre les menaces internes – leur soutien. Les conventions secr\u00e8tes sur le maintien de l’ordre int\u00e9rieur et de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 auraient stipul\u00e9 une demande formelle du gouvernement fran\u00e7ais comme condition pr\u00e9alable au d\u00e9ploiement des troupes fran\u00e7aises. – Pendant le r\u00e8gne de de Gaulle seulement, sept anciennes colonies africaines ont subi un changement de pouvoir ou un coup d’\u00c9tat. – (\u2026. ibid.)<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Les Accords Technico-Militaires ont oblig\u00e9 la France \u00e0 soutenir treize de ses quatorze Etats successeurs dans la constitution de leurs propres forces arm\u00e9es. Les \u00c9tats parties africains ont convenu de se tourner exclusivement ou principalement vers la France pour l’acquisition, l’entretien et le renouvellement des armes et autres mat\u00e9riels de guerre. Les accords de coop\u00e9ration en mati\u00e8re de d\u00e9fense comprenaient \u00e9galement des accords sur des mati\u00e8res premi\u00e8res et des produits d’importance strat\u00e9gique. Ils ont envisag\u00e9 une politique commune des mati\u00e8res premi\u00e8res et oblig\u00e9 les pays africains \u00e0 exporter du p\u00e9trole brut, du gaz naturel, de l’uranium, du thorium, du lithium, du b\u00e9ryllium, de l’h\u00e9lium ainsi que des minerais et leurs compos\u00e9s en priorit\u00e9 vers la France et \u00e0 aider les forces arm\u00e9es fran\u00e7aises dans leur stockage. \u00bb. (ibid.)<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00abLes accords les plus importants en termes de politique \u00e9conomique et associ\u00e9s \u00e0 une perte \u00e9vidente de souverainet\u00e9 concernaient les relations mon\u00e9taires. En contraste fonctionnel avec la balkanisation politico-territoriale de la r\u00e9gion, ils pr\u00e9voyaient la r\u00e9gulation supranationale des relations mon\u00e9taires dans le cadre de la zone franc, structure encore unique au monde aujourd’hui, qui garantit \u00e0 quatorze \u00c9tats souverains une monnaie commune – le franc CFA – dont la convertibilit\u00e9 est assur\u00e9e par le Tr\u00e9sor fran\u00e7ais. „(ibid.) <\/span><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00abLes accords culturels qui ont fa\u00e7onn\u00e9 l’\u00e9lite \u00e9taient \u00e9galement d’une importance durable en termes d’influence politique. En eux, les \u00c9tats de l’Afrique francophone se sont engag\u00e9s \u00e0 conserver le fran\u00e7ais comme langue officielle et instrument de leur d\u00e9veloppement „et \u00e0 se tourner vers la France en priorit\u00e9 pour r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 leurs besoins en enseignants. Conventions de r\u00e8glement, accords de coop\u00e9ration en mati\u00e8re de p\u00eache judiciaire des unit\u00e9s et une assistance personnelle dans la mise en place des structures \u00e9tatiques ont compl\u00e9t\u00e9 l’accord. „(ibid.)<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

\u00a0The Jacques Foccart System <\/span><\/span><\/h4>\n

El-Hussein Aw : A central figure in French Africa policy was basically Jacques Foccart until his death in March 1997. In 1960 he became General Secretary of the Communaut\u00e9 Fran\u00e7aise and, after independence, Secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence de la R\u00e9publique. This position, equipped with far-reaching power and exclusive privileges (direct access to de Gaulle, daily meetings in the evening), was retained even under Pompidou, although his power was reduced. Foccart had direct influence on the appointment of ambassadors, viewed copies of the diplomatic mail, controlled the Chefs de mission d\u2019aide et coop\u00e9ration and issued – by means of encrypted codes and in the presence of the Foreign Ministry – directives and instructions. Jacques Foccart achieved everything that he achieved in the African sphere of influence of France with the help of numerous networks (…) (Aw Online, edited; they are supplemented by page 18 of the study:) <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cOne of the most important tasks of Foccart was the direct contact with African elites and the representation of the French influence interests. In addition to his private business connections, which he stuck to despite his political office, he benefited above all from his knowledge as coordinator of the French secret and intelligence services. In trustful consultation with de Gaulle, he loyally implemented his instructions, advised African heads of state, received agents from the secret service SDECE every day and coordinated the Africa policy of the French bureaucracy in weekly secret meetings. In addition, he received the accredited French ambassadors in African countries and managed over 2500 visits from African ministers a year (according to Alfred Grosser 1990). „<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Le syst\u00e8me Jacques Foccart
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Une figure centrale de la politique de l’Afrique fran\u00e7aise \u00e9tait essentiellement Jacques Foccart jusqu’\u00e0 sa mort en mars 1997. En 1960, il devient secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de la Communaut\u00e9 fran\u00e7aise et, apr\u00e8s l’ind\u00e9pendance, secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence de la R\u00e9publique. Cette position, dot\u00e9e d’un pouvoir de grande envergure et de privil\u00e8ges exclusifs (acc\u00e8s direct \u00e0 de Gaulle, r\u00e9unions quotidiennes le soir), a \u00e9t\u00e9 conserv\u00e9e m\u00eame sous Pompidou, bien que son pouvoir ait \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9duit. Foccart a eu une influence directe sur la nomination des ambassadeurs, a consult\u00e9 des copies du courrier diplomatique, contr\u00f4l\u00e9 les chefs de mission d\u2019aide et de coop\u00e9ration et \u00e9mis – au moyen de codes crypt\u00e9s et en pr\u00e9sence du minist\u00e8re des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res – des directives et des instructions. Jacques Foccart a r\u00e9alis\u00e9 tout ce qu’il a r\u00e9alis\u00e9 dans la sph\u00e8re d’influence africaine de la France avec l’aide de nombreux r\u00e9seaux (…) (Aw Online, \u00e9dit\u00e9; compl\u00e9t\u00e9 par la page 18 de l’\u00e9tude \ud83d\ude42 <\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

\u00abL’une des t\u00e2ches les plus importantes de Foccart \u00e9tait le contact direct avec les \u00e9lites africaines et la repr\u00e9sentation des int\u00e9r\u00eats d’influence fran\u00e7ais. En plus de ses relations d’affaires priv\u00e9es, auxquelles il a tenu malgr\u00e9 sa fonction politique, il a surtout b\u00e9n\u00e9fici\u00e9 de ses connaissances en tant que coordinateur des services secrets et de renseignement fran\u00e7ais. En consultation confiante avec de Gaulle, il a fid\u00e8lement mis en \u0153uvre ses instructions, conseill\u00e9 des chefs d’\u00c9tat africains, re\u00e7u chaque jour des agents des services secrets SDECE et coordonn\u00e9 la politique africaine de la bureaucratie fran\u00e7aise lors de r\u00e9unions secr\u00e8tes hebdomadaires. En outre, il a re\u00e7u les ambassadeurs de France accr\u00e9dit\u00e9s dans les pays africains et a g\u00e9r\u00e9 plus de 2500 visites de ministres africains par an (selon Alfred Grosser 1990) „<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

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9.2. 2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Recommendation<\/span><\/h2>\n

Chapter IV „Cameroon: silence, we kill“<\/strong> in „Les Dessous de Franc’afrique“ (LINK to radiofrance.com<\/a>) by Monsieur X and Patrick Pesnot<\/strong> (Nouveau Monde editions, Paris 2008) is<\/span>
\nwritten lively and concisely but in a differentiated manner in easy French. It offers a portrait of the founder of the UPC, of the UPC and its massive oppression, and of the Foccard system, e.t.c.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/h3>\n

Le chapitre IV „Cameroun : silence, on tue“ <\/strong>dans „Les dessous de Franc,afrique<\/strong>“ (LIEN \u00e0 la ) de Monsieur X et Patrick Pesnot<\/strong> (Nouveau Monde \u00e9ditions, Paris 2008) est<\/em><\/span>
\nr\u00e9dig\u00e9 de mani\u00e8re vivante et concise mais diff\u00e9renci\u00e9 dans un fran\u00e7ais lisible,. Il propose un portrait du fondateur de l’UPC, de l’UPC et de son oppression massive, et du syst\u00e8me Foccard, e.t.c.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

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BIBLIO. :\u00a0 17 good links on the net<\/span><\/span> \/ <\/span>17 liens\u00a0 sur le net :<\/span>
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HISTORY, POLITICS \/ HISTOIRE, POLITIQUE<\/span>\u00a0<\/span> <\/span><\/h3>\n

Le mus\u00e9e \u00abMARKK\u00bb de Rothenbaum \u00e0 Hambourg consacre actuellement au Duala Manga Bell une exposition chaleureuse et \u00e9motive destin\u00e9e aux jeunes (LIEN)<\/a>, catalogue en anglais en option!).<\/span> Pourtant, je ne veux pas commencer par le jour de son ex\u00e9cution au d\u00e9but de la meurtri\u00e8re \u00abguerre mondiale\u00bb en Europe.<\/span> Avec le conflit sur leur propri\u00e9t\u00e9 ancestrale dans le centre de Douala, l’\u00e9lite urbaine Duala a v\u00e9cu de premi\u00e8re main la violence de la conqu\u00eate coloniale dont d’autres peuples du Cameroun ont souffert pendant des ann\u00e9es.<\/span> Le fait que les ma\u00eetres coloniaux allemands aient \u00e9t\u00e9 bient\u00f4t \u00e9chang\u00e9s, a confondu les all\u00e9geances apr\u00e8s 1919 et a emp\u00each\u00e9 une r\u00e9sistance commune.<\/span> L’Europe, affaiblie par les guerres et les r\u00e9volutions, a tenu les colonies conquises pendant encore quarante ans – et au-del\u00e0.<\/span><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n